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COMMENTARY
THE COLORADO SUPREME COURT ADDRESSES
REASONABLE DILIGENCE IN THE
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INTRODUCTION

In its recent decision of Municipal Subdistrict, Northern Colorado
Water Conservancy District v. Chevron Shale Oil Co., the Colorado
Supreme Court addressed the law with respect to reasonable diligence
in the continuation of a conditional water right.'
The Subdistrict appealed the water court's finding of reasonable
diligence in Chevron's development of its conditional water rights.
Chevron's rights related to its shale oil project in Western Colorado.
The conditional water rights originated in the early 1950s, which
Chevron had appropriated to three structures for use in proposed
pumping plants and pipelines.
The Subdistrict claimed that Chevron did not demonstrate
reasonable diligence in the development of its rights. It further
claimed that Chevron's intent to hold the rights for over 100 years
without development amounted to unlawful speculation in conditional
water rights.
II. BACKGROUND
Under Colorado's Prior Appropriation Doctrine, one may receive
a decree for a conditional water right before actually applying water to
'I Darrell Brown is a 1999 graduate of the University of Denver College of Law,
where he served as Water Court Editor of the Water Law Review. He received his A.B.
from Stanford University in 1975, and his M.B.A. from the Amos Tuck School at
Dartmouth College in 1979.
1. Municipal Subdistrict, N. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v. Chevron Shale Oil
Co., 986 P.2d 918, 920 (Colo. 1999) (hereinafter Municipal District).
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beneficial use. A conditional water right is "a right to perfect a water
right with a certain priority upon the completion with reasonable
diligence of the appropriation upon which such water right is...
based.",2 The primary value of a conditional right is that "a prospective
water user may reserve its place in line in the priority system by seeking
a conditional decree, provided that the user demonstrates to the water
court that the water can and will be put to beneficial use within a
reasonable time."'
The public policy surrounding a conditional right is to "encourage
the pursuit of projects designed to place waters of the state to
beneficial uses by reserving an antedated priority, in light of the
necessity to obtain and complete financing, engineering, and the
construction of works that will capture, possess, or otherwise control
the water., 4 By design, a conditional right fulfills the "fundamental
policy underlying Colorado's water law favoring the most beneficial
use of the state's limited water supply." 5 However, to allow, an
applicant to "maintain its conditional appropriation indefinitely and
without progress would frustrate that fundamental policy. '6 Therefore,
public policy limits a conditional right against the speculative hoarding
of a water right.
"Accumulation of conditional water rights is subject to Colorado's
anti-speculation doctrine."' To avoid speculation, the water court may
not recognize an appropriation if the "purported appropriator of
record does not have a specific plan and intent to divert, store, or
otherwise capture, possess, and control a specific quantity of water for
specific beneficial uses.""
ColoradoRiver Water ConservationDistrict v. Vidler Tunnel Water Co. 9 is
the seminal case defining Colorado's anti-speculation doctrine.0 The
Vidler court noted that Colorado law gives:
no one the right to preempt the development potential of water for
the anticipated future use of others not in privity of contract, or in
any agency relationship, with the developer regarding that use. To
recognize conditional decrees grounded on no interest beyond a
desire to obtain water for sale would as a practical matter discourage
those who have need and use for the water from developing it.

2. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-103(6) (1999).
3. Dallas Creek Water Co. v. Huey, 933 P.2d 27,35 (Colo. 1997).
4. Id.

5. Trans-County Water Inc. v. Central Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 727 P.2d
60, 65 (Colo. 1986).
6.
7.
8.

Id.
Dallas Creek, 933 P.2d at 36.
COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-103(3) (a) (II) (1999); Act ofJuly 6, 1979, § 5, ch. 346,

1979 Colo.Sess. Laws 1366, 1368.
9. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. Vidler Tunnel Water Co., 594 P.2d
566 (Colo. 1979).
10. City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Co., 926 P.2d 1, 37 (Colo. 1996).
11. Vidler, 594 P.2d at 568.
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The Colorado legislature codified the anti-speculative holding of
Vidler in the statutory definition of an "appropriation."
An
appropriation does not "occur when the proposed appropriation is
based upon the speculative sale or transfer of the appropriative rights
to persons not parties to the proposed appropriation."' Speculative
sale or transfer may be shown when the:
purported appropriator.., does not have either a legally vested
interest or a reasonable expectation of procuring such interest in the
lands or facilities to be served by such appropriation, unless such
appropriator is a governmental agency or an agent in fact for the
persons proposed to be benefited by such appropriation [or if the
appropriator] does not have a specific plan and intent to... [put] a
specific quantity of water [to] specific beneficial use[]. [
pu
Successful challenges grounded on the anti-speculation doctrine
have succeeded where the non-governmental applicant did not show
that it intended to put the water to beneficial use for its own
purposes. 4
Challenges have also succeeded where the private
appropriator did not require the water for use on its own lands that it
owned or leased and where they had no contractual commitment with
any governmental entity to use the water.'5
The anti-speculation doctrine does not on its face seem to deny
the right to hold a conditional water right for specific use in a specific
quantity by the appropriator so long as an intent exists to place the
water to use within an indeterminate time. Instead, conditional rights
are made "subject to continued scrutiny to prevent the hoarding of
priorities 'to the detriment of those seeking to apply the state's water
beneficially.' "1
To fulfill and balance the twin goals of encouraging large water
projects while also preventing hoarding, Colorado law requires that in:
every sixth calendar year after the calendar year in which a water
right is conditionally decreed,. .. the owner or user thereof, if such
owner or user desires to maintain the same, shall file an application
for a finding of reasonable diligence, or said conditional water right
shall be considered abandoned.
"[A] reasonable diligence proceeding tests whether the decreed
conditional appropriation is being effectively pursued in a manner
12. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-103(3) (a) (1999).
13. Id § 37-92-103(3)(a)(I)-(II).
14. See Rocky Mtn. Power Co. v. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist., 646 P.2d
383, 388 (Colo. 1982).
15. Lionelle v. Southeastern Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 676 P.2d 1162, 1169
(Colo. 1984).
16. Dallas Creek Water Co. v. Huey, 933 P.2d 27, 35 (Colo. 1997) (quoting TransCounty Water, Inc. v. Central Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 727 P.2d 60, 65 (Colo.
1986)).
17. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-301(4) (a) (I) (1999).
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calculated to complete that appropriation.""8 Colorado courts have
further justified and heightened the required scrutiny of a conditional
water right by finding that " '[t] he doctrine of relation back is a legal
fiction in derogation of the Constitution for the benefit of claimants
under larger and more difficult projects and should be strictly
construed.' "9
The burden of proof of diligence rests with the holder of the
conditional right, and thus, " It]he applicant has the burden of proving
reasonable diligence by a preponderance of the evidence." 0 The
water court's findings as to meeting the burden of proving diligence is
"binding on apeal where ... there is competent evidence to support
those findings.
The statutory standard by which the water court must measure
reasonable diligence is:
the steady application of effort to complete the appropriation in a
reasonably expedient and efficient manner under all the facts and
circumstances. When a project or integrated system is comprised of
several features, work on one feature of the project or system shall be
considered in finding that reasonable diligence has been shown in
the development of water rights for all features of the entire project
or system.... [C]urrent economic conditions beyond the control of
the applicant which adversely affect the feasibility of perfecting a
conditional water right.., shall [not] be considered sufficient to
deny a diligence application, so long as other facts and circumstances
which show diligence are present.2
The Colorado legislature amended this standard in 1990. Prior to
1990, the statute required an applicant to show "continuous project
specific effort... in the most expedient and efficient manner.",13 The
amended section has arguably relaxed the standard for a finding of
reasonable diligence.
The Colorado Supreme Court has approved and applied various
narrative standards to aid in the determination of reasonable
diligence. "[T] he applicant must prove that it has the intent to use the
water and has performed concrete actions demonstrating diligent
efforts to finalize its appropriation. 24 To show diligent efforts the
applicant must "prove continuous, project-specific effort directed
toward the development of the conditional right commensurate with

18. Dallas Creek, 933 P.2d at 36.
19. Id. at 35 (quoting City & County of Denver v. Northern Colo. Water
Conservancy Dist., 276 P.2d 992, 1001 (Colo. 1954)).
20. Talco, Ltd. v. Danielson, 769 P.2d 468, 472 (Colo. 1989).
21. Vail Valley Consolidated Water Dist. v. City of Aurora, 731 P.2d 665, 670 (Colo.
1987).
22. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-301(4) (b), (c) (1999) (emphasis added).
23. Act of Apr. 13, 1990, § 1, ch. 269, 1990 Colo. Sess. Laws 1625, 1625-26
(emphasis added). See also Upper Gunnison River Water Conservancy Dist. v. Board of
County Comm'rs, 841 P.2d 1061, 1064 n.7 (Colo. 1992).
24. Dallas Creek Water Co. v. Huey, 933 P.2d 27, 36 (Colo. 1997).
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his capabilities. 2 5 The water court should consider the "totality of the
circumstances, 26 in making its determination.
Thus, the
"determination of diligence can only be made on a case-by-case basis
after considering all of the facts and circumstances
relating to the
27
development of each particular project.,
The considerations may include, but are not limited to:
(1) economic feasibility; (2) the status of rejuisite permit
applications and other required approvals; (3) expenditures made to
develop the appropriation; (4) the ongoing conduct of engineering
and environmental studies; (5) the design and construction of
facilities; and (6) the nature and extent of land holdings and
contracts demonstrating the water demand and2beneficial
uses which
the conditional right is to serve when perfected. 8
Other factors which the Colorado Supreme Court has found
persuasive include: "the size and complexity of [the] project; the
extent of the construction season; the availability of materials, labor,
and equipment; the economic ability of the claimant; and the
intervention of outside delaying factors such as wars, strikes, and
litigation."29 If "a project is comprised of several features, work on one
feature can be considered in determining whether reasonable
diligence has been shown in the development of water rights for all
features."
"Actual good faith work on the overall facilities necessary
to consummate the ultimate goal is a part of the diligence required to
continue the conditional decree."'"

M. CURRENT CASE
In Municipal Subdistrict, the Subdistrict claimed that the water court
erred on three issues in its finding that Chevron demonstrated
reasonable diligence. First, the court erred by not imposing a more
stringent
standard of reasonable diligence as a conditional water right
152
ages. Second, the Subdistrict argued that Chevron's past efforts had
not resulted in any actual progress towards the perfection of its
conditional water rights."3
Third, the Subdistrict claimed that
Chevron's participation in ajoint venture with two other oil companies
retarded Chevron's progress towards the perfection of its own
25.
26.
27.
1139,
28.

Id.
Id.
Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. City & County of Denver, 640 P.2d
1141 (Colo. 1982).
Dallas Creek, 933 P.2d at 36.

29. City & County of Denver, 640 P.2d at 1142 (citing Colorado River Water
Conservation Dist. v. Twin Lakes Reservoir & Canal Co., 468 P.2d 853, 856 (Colo.
1970)).
30. Dallas Creek Water Co. v. Huey, 933 P.2d 27, 36 (Colo. 1997).
31. City of Lafayette v. New Anderson Ditch Co., 962 P.2d 955, 961 (Colo. 1998).
32. Municipal Subdistrict, N. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v. Chevron Shale Oil
Co., 986 P.2d 918, 921 (Colo. 1999).
33. Id. at 922.
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34
conditional water rights.

The Colorado Supreme Court held that, contrary to the
Subdistrict's claims, competent evidence supported the water court's
findings of reasonable diligence.35
The water court found that Chevron had pursued activities in
seven categories satisfying the reasonable diligence requirement.
These included: (1) planning a diversion facility; (2) planning a dam;
(3) planning pipeline facilities; (4) preparing environmental baseline
studies; (5) preparing a detailed master plan; (6) participating in
activities related to the conditional rights such as litigation, research,
and studies; and (7) continuing basic research into oil shale
production technology.36 The Subdistrict challenged only the accuracy
of the seventh category.
The Subdistrict based its primary challenge of the diligence
finding on the grounds that Chevron had not demonstrated the
"steady application of effort to complete the appropriation in a
reasonably expedient and efficient manner. 3 7 The Subdistrict claimed
that Chevron's efforts had not been continuous, and alleged that
Chevron had decided to defer its oil shale project until 2085.
The supreme court agreed with the water court that although "the
production of oil shale is currently not feasible, Chevron's efforts,
although minimal, were sufficient to demonstrate a steady application
of effort to complete the appropriation in a reasonably expedient and
efficient manner.""
By so finding, the court held that it was not
improper for the water court to consider the current economic
conditions of the shale industry in a determination of reasonable
diligence.
Because the issues were not properly raised before the water court,
the supreme court declined to address the question of whether the
anti-speculation doctrine applies in a diligence proceeding or whether
postponement of perfecting the rights until 2085 violated antispeculation.
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE CASE
The economic feasibility of the oil shale industry always seems to
lie just around the corner of the next oil shortage. Even with oil prices
near $40/bbl. during the early 1980s, the industry only made
economic sense based on a continued increase in oil prices. Since the
current economic unfeasibility of the oil shale industry is not sufficient
to deny a diligence application, it would seem this must be coupled
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id.
Id. at 924.
Id. at 921.
Id. (citing COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-301(4) (b) (1999)).

38. Municipal Subdistrict, N. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v. Chevron Shale Oil
Co., 986 P.2d 918, 923 (Colo. 1999).

39. Id. at 923-24.
40. Id. at 923.
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with a requirement of stricter proof that as the conditional right ages
the appropriator will place the water to beneficial use within a
reasonable time. To not require this eliminates one of the primary
purposes of sextennial reasonable diligence findings: prevention of
hoarding of junior priority dates to the detriment of those who can
and will place waters of the state to more immediate beneficial use. In
essence, the people of Colorado are allowing senior priority rights to
the waters of the state to be held and invested by the oil shale industry
without the promise of any future return.
Municipal Subdistrict also raises questions as to whether the
codification of Vidler went far enough in preventing long term
hoarding of conditional water rights. Vidler was limited by its facts to
speculation based on the sale of water rights to other parties. It did
not address the issue of whether hoarding of a right by an entity for its
own use far in the future falls within the anti-speculation doctrine. By
codifying the holding of Vidler, the state legislature essentially
exempted such hoarding from the doctrine. To allow a nongovernmental entity to hold such a right would seem to frustrate the
fundamental policy of Colorado water law, which favors the
development of the current beneficial use of the state's scarce water
resources.
Under the Municipal Subdistrict holding, a junior absolute right
may, if the senior conditional right is eventually perfected, find itself
unable to divert more than a century after it has placed water to
beneficial use. As Vidler stated, this will, as a practical matter,
discourage those who have current uses of water from developing
rights junior to the senior conditional right.
Because of the arguably loosened standards applied in today's
diligence proceedings, the water courts seem much less likely to find a
lack of diligence in the development of a conditional right. Today's
diligence proceedings will not serve their proper function of balancing
between the potential hoarding of water priorities and reasonable
development. This seems contrary to the finding that the doctrine of
relation back is a legal fiction in derogation of the state Constitution
that should be strictly construed.
The supreme court reasonably interpreted the statutory provisions
Had the Subdistrict properly
relating to reasonable diligence.
presented the speculation issues before the court, the supreme court
probably also would have found that Chevron had not violated the
anti-speculation doctrine as codified. Instead, the legislature must
address these issues. For the legislature to fail to clarify the proper
balance between the anti-speculation doctrine and reasonable
diligence proceedings will lead to the inefficient allocation of the
waters of the state.

